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"PROVIDING FOR THE LEGITIMATE LABOUR REQUIREMENTS OF EMPLOYERS" :
SECONDARY INDUSTRY, COMMERCE AND THE STATE IN SOUTH AFRICA DURING THE
1950s AND 1960s
by Deborah Posel
It is government policy to provide for the legitimate
labour requirements of employers.
Marxist discussions of the South African State during the 1950s and
'60s have emphasised the ways in which, contrary to liberal expecta-
tions, this ideological promise was in fact fulfilled. The striking
economic growth rates of the 1960s - 9.3% between 1963 and 1968 - at a
time of intensified political repression, are prima facie evidence of
their case that overall, Apartheid did not damage the cause of economic
development in South Africa. The migrant labour system, influx control
policies and the state's refusal to permit the registration of African
trade unions, are shown to have reproduced an abundant supply of cheap
black labour on which the economy thrived.
However, there are limitations in examining the relationship between
Apartheid and economic development in solely synchronic terms, as an
outcome rather than an ongoing process. This sort of approach is
typically disinterested in the relationship between the original
intentions of Apartheid an<l its actual outcomes, and the factors
interposing between the two. As a result, by implication, Apartheid
during the '50s and '60s is depicted as if a relatively static,
nationally homogenous policy, a political 'fait accompli'. (Thus, it
is usually only when ' revisionist' analyses move on to the 1970s that
the foundations and methods of state policy are examined for signs of
vacillation and change). Furthermore, the bourgeoisie is cast largely
as the passive beneficiary of this system, having rapidly "learned to
live with the pass laws, migrant labour and native Reserves" and whose
political and ideological protests were at best short-lived.
A closer look at the '50s and '60s reveals, however, an uneven com-
bination of continuities and shifts in state practice. Neither these
continuities nor changes are self-explanatory. They indicate the
fluctuating balance of forces - political, ideological and economic -
which either kept Apartheid policies on the course intended by its
practitioners, or deflected their outcomes to the point where the
negation of fundamental principles of Apartheid produced some signif-
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icant changes in the intentions and methods of state policy. Moreover,
the bourgeoisie was an active participant in this process, rather than
its quiescent beneficiary. This paper focuses on the role of secondary
industry and commerce in particular, in shaping the production of some
key aspect of Apartheid policy. Both the direct political interven-
tions of organised commerce and industry, and the indirect political
pressure exerted by the weight of routine industrial and commercial
practice, evidence an ongoing struggle with the state over the
distribution, composition and accessibility of the black labour force
in secondary industry and commerce. This discussion thus sheds a less
functionalist light on the relationship between economic and political
interests. Apartheid neither automatically nor uniformly promoted
capitalist interests.
The paper begins with a brief description of some of the declared
intentions of Apartheid policy during the 1950s. It then shows how, in
the context of the relative stasis and ultimate decline of the manufac-
turing sector in the 1950s, secondary industry and commerce were
(partly) responsible for subverting some of these original goals. The
last part of the paper then identifies the resultant shift in declared
state policy, evident by the early 1960s, and discusses the impact of
secondary industry and commerce upon these policies during the boom
conditions of the 1960s.
The bedrock of Apartheid has always been the utilisation of an
abundant supply of black labour in ways which protect and entrench
white supremacy. Once the National Party came to power in 1948, eco-
nomic growth was to be directed within a policital process which barred
the black population from the institutions of parliamentary democracy
in the country (including trade unions), so as to pre-empt the black
majority's advance to economic and political power.
This perception of an economic and political "swart gevaar" was
central to Nationalist planning and practice from the early 1950s. In
1951, Verwoerd (then Minister of Native Affairs) warned industry and
commerce that
in 50 years time, the number of Natives and the number of
trained and educated Natives will have increased to a
large extent and it will be impossible to keep them from
having political influence. Political equality and all
other forms of integration will follow.
The Nationalist solution was to reduce the presence of blacks in
"white" South Africa, the urban areas in particular, but without
jeopardising the supply of black labour to each sector of the economy.
Also, those blacks who did reside in "white" areas were to be treated
as "visitors" with no claim on any social or political rights and
whose presence there was justified by white economic need alone.
From the beginning therefore, the Nationalist government perceived
the prospect of an uncontrolled influx of blacks from the Reserves into
the urban areas, as a profound threat to the desired coupling of White
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political supremacy and economic advance. For, on the one hand, the
agricultural sector (whose class interests were championed politically
by the National Party) could not attract labour away from the towns
where wages were highest. Any spontaneous influx to the towns could
therefore bypass the farms, exacerbating the existing agricultural
labour shortage. On the other hand, a growing black urban population
was feared as the source of a mounting and ultimately irresistible
political pressure for the enfranchisement of blacks. Like its segre-
gationist predecessor, the Apartheid blueprint thus envisaged a society
in which the state controlled the allocation of black labour to all
sectors of the economy, so as to expedite economic growth without
relinguishing control over the rate, location and conditions of black
urbanisation. State intervention was intended to secure the matching
of labour demand and supply in a way which emulated the rationality of
the market, but avoided the massive influx to the towns which the
abandonment of labour allocation to market forces would allegedly have
produced-
This required state intervention on (at least) two fronts. Firstly
the state was to impose restrictions on the size of the black urban
population and rate of migration from the Reserves (thus reducing the
supply of black urban labour). Secondly, in order that this reduction
remain compatible with urban labour needs, these needs themselves
warranted readjusting (reducing and transforming the demand for urban
black labour).
The first series of interventions would devolve partly on promoting
the "development" of the Reserves, in order to create positive incen-
tives for the efflux of blacks from "white" areas of South Africa. But
the major emphasis fell upon the intensification of influx and efflux
control. Influx of blacks to prescribed areas would be strictly
limited according to economic need. Only those blacks offered employ-
ment once the labour already available in the area had been used up,
would gain legal entry. Thus a strict urban labour preference policy
would reduce the economic need for black migration from the Reserves.
The compulsory registration of all employment contracts with the labour
bureaux would ensure that labour could be channelled evenly to all
sector of the economy, eliminating the presence of any labour surplus
or bottlenecks.
The second and parallel, series of interventions included the
placing of restrictions on the rate of industrial development in the
urban areas.
As nywerheidsontwikkeling onbeheerd voortgaan, (sal dit)
.. . steeds groter instroming van naturelle meebring .. .
Saam met die beginsel van behoorlike beheer van instroming
gaan behoorlike beheer van nywerheidsontwikkeling.
In addition, State action stressed the need to encourage labour -
intensive industries in particular to decentralise to border areas,
where labour could be drawn from neighbouring Reserves. Both this
decentralisation process and state-imposed curbs on industrial expan-
sion in the urban areas would diminish the demand for unskilled black
labour in these areas, and thus help to curb the rate of black
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control policy. It formed the basis of the amendment to Section 10(1)
of the Urban Areas (Amendment) Act, promulgated in the Native Laws
Amendment Act of 1952. Verwoerd told Parliament that one of the
objects of this legislation was to give "certain definite classes (of
blacks) guarantees, security and stability". The amended Section
10(1) exempted certain categories of blacks from the restriction of not
remaining in a prescribed area longer than 72 hours without a valid
work permiet issued by a labour bureau. Persons who had been born in
the prescribed area and had lived there permanently (Section 10(1) (a)
qualifiers), or who had worked continuously for one employer for 10
years or for different employers for 15 years (Section 10(1)(b)
qualifiers), and their wives and dependent children (Section 10(1)(c)
qualifiers) were recognised as legal urban residents whether or not
they remained subsequently employed. Thus, the "unproductive" wives
and children, or unemployed and otherwise "idle" Section 10(1)(a) and
(b) qualifiers, were exempted from the category "superfluous". Section
10(1)(a)(b)(c) rights were to be a protection against removal from the
prescribed area. Verwoerd made the point when defending the 1952
Native Laws Amendment Bill in Parliament:
When we apply a yardstick for the removal of these
("superfluous") persons, how are we to apply it? ... Of
whom can we say fundamentally: "We are not going to
interfere with you. We regard you as Natives of the
city"? Surely they are those who were born there and
reside there permanently, and who have their families with
them. They are secondly .. . those who are such good
workers that they have stayed a long time in the city with
one employer ... (or) with different employers. All these
people are urbanized.
Apartheid policy thus fell immediately into an important contradic-
tion. On the one hand, its ideologically and politically fundamental
principles permitted the presence of blacks in "white" areas only as
long as they ministered to white economic needs. Employment alone
justified the residence of blacks outside the Reserves, since
Nationalist principle "cannot allow a Native to get a permanent vested
interest in a European area". Yet, on the other hand, in one of the
first pieces of legislation enacted by the Nationalists, a certain
class of black persons was classified as "urbanized", and accorded
legal residential status in a prescribed area irrespective of whether
or not, after satisfying the conditions of Section 10(l)(a)(b) or (c),
they became and remained unemployed.
For this reason, as we shall see, during the 1960s Section 10(1)
became the target of concerted attacks within the state, having been
declared a legal and ideological anomally for exactly these grounds.
The Minister of Bantu Affairs, for example, asserted in 1962 that as a
result of "the entrenched provisions of Section 10 of Act No. 25 of
1945, ... the basic principle that the Bantu's presence in the white
areas can be justified only by the need for his labour, is thereby
thwarted". It produces
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the phenomenon of continuous growth of the urban Bantu
population as a result of natural increases, irrespective
of whether or not the labour requirements of a particular
urban area justifies such a large urban Bantu residential
area.
It was then, in the 1960s, that the emphasis of state policy shifted
towards the extension of the migrant labour system and erosion of
Section 10(1)(a)(b)(c) privileges.
As we have seen, during the 1950s however, the state had the opp-
osite immediate priorities: to initiate a slow end to migrant labour,
at the same time as differentiating administratively and ideologically
between migrant and "urbanized" worker^* shoring up the "guarantees,
security and stability" of the latter. The interesting question is
why? Why didn't the state set about reducing all black urban dwellers
to "temporary" migrants from the start, making the urban residence of
all wholly contingent upon their employment in the prescribed area?
The motivation behind the state's policy during the 1950s was not to
incorporate or co-opt the "privileged" groups. Rather, it must be
understood in the context of the state's intentions to control polit-
ically the supply and demand of black labour. To summarise then, the
imposition of legal curbs on the scale of urban industrial expansion,
promotion of the decentralisation of labour - intensive industries in
particular and mechanisation within the remaining urban industries,
were aimed at reducing the overall numerical demand for black labour in
the urban areas. This reduction, coupled with a strict urban labour
preference policy, would curtail the economic dependence on migrant
labour, which would in turn contribute to lessening the influx of
blacks into the prescribed areas (metropolitan areas in particular).
The priority of this policy was thus the reduction of an additional
black influx to the towns, by reducing and indeed shaping the
"legitimate labour requirements of employers" in the urban areas so
that the labour force already urbanized would meet most, if not all, of
these needs. The differentiation imposed by Section 10(1) provided the
instrument of the necessary urban labour preference policy: "labour
requirements of employers" were to be met in the first instance by
those workers already settled in the area viz. Section 10(1)(a)(b)
qualifiers. The accepted consequence and very condition of effective
influx control was thus the entrenchment of a settled, urbanized black
population - although purportedly in the short term only.
Government leaders also saw and accepted that as a consequence of
this influx centred policy, the socio-economic differentials between
the settled urbanized blacks and mirgrants resident in prescribed areas
on a "temporary" basis, would grow. Eiselen, Secretary for Native
Affairs, for example, speaking of the need to boost the efficiency and
productivity of black labour, urged the "recognition of continuous
efficient service by progressive grading within each labour category"
and "the raising of an employees wages as his efficiency improves".
It was clearly permanent, urbanized workers whom he had in mind as
candidates for such promotions and wage increases. This he associated
in turn with the prospect of "building up an economic mentality which
fosters self-help and leads to increasing achievements." For, once
f/iovldiag. {JOA. the. Legitimate Labour Requirement* of.
they were earning more, "bona fide urban Natives" would, and should be
encouraged to, "invest their savings in home ownership". While
lessening the state's financial burden in administering the townships,
this "economic mentality" would "also at the same time lay a sound
foundation for the development of stable and self-disciplined com-
munities. "
While the state's intension to encourage the administrative and
socio-economic differentiation of the black population makes some sense
of the introduction of Section 10(1), it does not resolve the contra-
dictions in the Apartheid blueprint. The contradiction still stands
between the terms of Section 10(1)(a),(b) and (c), and the principle
that employment alone justified the residence of blacks in the "white"
areas. Secondly, the recognition and entrenchment of a stable,
urbanized black population as "permanent" conflicted with the long-term
intention continually to reduce the size of the black population in
"white" areas. For, Section 10(1)(c) would sponsor an expanding perma-
nent urban population, by extending the same "guarantees, security and
stability" to successive generations.
The first of these contradictions could have remained hidden as long
as an urban labour preference policy prevailed. As long as the labour
needs of urban employers were met in the first instance by the settled
black workforce, then unemployment would be eliminated within this
group (given a greater number of job opportunities than urbanized work-
seekers) . Also, if an urban labour preference policy succeeded in
reducing dependency on migrant labour, the growth in the size of the
black urban population would approximate more closely its natural
increase, thereby dampening {although not eliminating) the second
contradiction.
A strict urban labour preference policy was clearly crucial to the
coherence of the entire programme. Yet, its introduction in the
context of the "legitimate labour requirements of employers" during the
1950s was premised upon a specious assumption, namely, that in an
economy in which a very high percentage of the black workforce was
still unskilled and industries predominantly labour-intensive,
industrial employers would nevertheless find good reasons to employ
urbanized black workers in preference to migrants. Ironically, it was
the operation of Section 10(1) itself which subverted this assumption.
For, the application of Section 10(1) engendered a differentiated
workforce : migrant workers, on one hand, whose legal access to
prescribed areas and whose legal accommodation there remained contin-
gent upon employment, and Section 10(1)(a)(b)(c) qualifiers, on the
other hand, whose right to remain in the prescribed area did not lapse
if unemployed and whose access to family housing depended on their
qualifications rather than their employment. Clearly, the former were
far more dependent on continued employment and thus less likely to be
choosy when offered a job paying low wages, with poor working
conditions - especially in the presence of a labour surplus.
Section 10(1)(a) and (b) qualifiers, on the other hand, were able to
be more selective in accepting employment, being less threatened by the
loss or temporary absence of a job. Employers whose "labour require-
ment" was still a largely unskilled, cheap and docile black workforce
thus had good reasons to prefer employing migrants. As we shall see,
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once a practise of urban labour preference thus failed to materialsie,
the contradictory implications of Section 10(1) for the overall,
longterm Apartheid blueprint, grew more apparent and more acute. By
the early '60s, some of the goals and methods of influx control policy
were therefore targetted for change.
The discussion so far has shown that Apartheid policy was devised
with the aim of "providing for the legitimate labour requirements of
employers" in ways which minimised the presence of blacks in the
"white" urban areas of the country. This in turn devolved upon a
series of assumptions about, and restrictions on, what these "labour
requirements" would be. The following discussion examines how second-
ary industry and commerce acted in the name of a conflicting definition
of their "legitimate labour requirements", so as to subvert some of the
original intentions of the Apartheid policy and exacerbate the
manifestations of its internal contradictions. (This analysis concen-
trates on struggles between secondary industry, commerce and the state
over state attempts to restrict the size of the black urban population
and workforce and the scale of urban industrial development).
Organised commerce and industry concurred with many of the original
intentions of state policy. The AHI, ASSOCOM, FCI agreed iwth state
actors about the desirability in principle of laboyr. "stabilisation",
by way of a slow end to the migrant labour system and the entrench-
ment of a settled black urban population on which urban industry and
commerce should draw as its primary supplier of labour. As the AHI
said in evidence to the Tomlinson Commission,
Fundamentally, we are against migratory labour . . . Where
you have an established industrial community such as you
have on the Rand, such labour must be drawn from permanent
residents and not from migratory labour.
Moreover, ASSOCOM, FCI and the AHI all applauded the state's
intention to encourage the increased utilisation of black labour in
semi-skilled positions, and the payment of accordingly higher wages.
Neither were organised commerce and industry opposed to the principle
state intervention in the labour market. It was accepted that the
migration of blacks to the cities should be "subject to the proper
guidance by the NAD (Native Affairs Department) as distinct from
control. In terms of this stand, the size of the black urban
workforce, the rate of black urbanisation and urban industrial
expansion should be regulated by "the operation of economic forces
rather than by direct and drastic intervention through control
measures".
Conflict with the state thus centred around state policy to impose
"direct and drastic" curbs on the rate of urban industrial development,
inhibit the growth of the black urban industrial and commercial work-
force, and control coercively the influx and efflux of blacks from the
urban areas. ASSOCOM, for example, stressed that the goal of the
labour bureaux, to match exactly the demand and supply of black labour,
was economically restrictive in "establishing an artificial situation
of full employment". A labour surplus in the ,±pwns was considered a
"legitimate requirement of employers" in itself.
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Employers' struggles to preserve an unrestricted black labour
supply and surplus in the towns were waged on two fronts: directly;
through the political interventions of organised commerce and
industry, and indirectly, by the way of the employment practices
pursued by secondary industry and commerce. These will be discussed in
turn.
The first step taken by the state to restrict the supply of black
urban labour was to place curbs on the employment of "foreign" blacks.
The 1954 Urban Areas Amendment Act stipulated that once a "foreign"
black working within South Africa, left his present employer, he would
not be permitted to seek other jobs within the country. The measure
met with widespread opposition from organised commerce and industry,
particularly from those Chambers in parts of the country bordering on
the High Commission territories. The response within the state was
exemplary of a pattern which soon emerged in policies affecting the
supply of black labour: while refusing to modify the terms of the law
or compromise the general principle, Verwoerd "advised protesting
bodies that the law is to be carried out but that certain concessions
will be made." Thus the state persisted with legislation which
conformed rigidly to the Nationalists' ideological principles, but
which conferred Ministerial powers in excess of those seen to be needed
at the time. Maintaining the appearance of an uncompromising adherence
to the Nationalist grand plan scored ideological points, while the
possibility of concessions created space for the differential treatment
of particular industries in specific geographicl areas. So, in the
case in question, blanket restrictions on the use of "foreign" black
labour were depicted in state discourse as a matter of fundamental
principle, whereas in fact, the law could function to channel the flow
of "foreign" labour to certain geographical areas and industries.
Opposition from organised commerce and industry failed to deter
state actors from initiating the policy of curbing the rate of
industrial expansion in metropolitan areas, the Rand in particular. A
letter from the Johannesburg Town Clerk to ASSOCOM in January 1955, for
example, reported
the Minister's refusal to approve of the establishment of
additional industrial townships, notably in Boksburg ...
Some of the Reef Councils felt that strict enforcement of
the terms of the (Ministerial) directive might freeze for
some considerable time the development of their communi-
ties and result probably in a prejudice to their future.
The extent to which such curbs were imposed has been difficult to
ascertain. According to press reports, the policy was not blanketly
applied; concessions were made even on the Rand. Furthermore, the
publications, speeches and Non-European Affairs Committee meetings of
organised commerce and industry seem to make little mention of the
matter, which suggests that as yet the restrictions were neither severe
nor persistent. Only in 1957 was "government policy (again) accused of
preventing the establishment of further industrial townships on the
Witwatersrand by disallowing the use of derelict mine areas for
industrial purposes."
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It seems therefore, that during the 1950s, the scale of state
intervention in forcibly containing urban industrial expansion was
limited. But this had little to do with the political interventions of
organised commerce and industry. It was more likely a function of the
economic conditions of the time. As Duncan Innes points out, between
1950 and I960,
the manufacturing sector was ... in a state of relative
backwardness ... manufacturing is lurched from instability
in the early 1950s into decline and ultimately crisis.
Industrial output, which had grown by 7.2% in 1954, grew
by 4.4% in 1955t 3.4% in 1956, 2.3% in 1957, and only 1.7%
in 1958. In 1959 minus growth of -1.4% was recorded.
During the 1950s, moves to curb the scale of industrial employment
were therefore low on the state's agenda, partly because the threat of
an ever-swelling black urban workforce diminished in accordance with
the decline in the industrial growth rate. But in addition, the
obvious point is worth making - that when the chips were down for
secondary industry, the state was not going to intervene to make
matters worse. The political restrictions on industrial development in
metropolitan areas and on the size of the black urban workforce,
intensified as a function of the economic strength of secondary in-
dustry (during the ' 60s). They were consequent upon the expansion of
this sector, rather than the instruments of its decline.
Attempts by ASSOCOM and FCI to impinge upon the administration of
influx control were likewise ineffectual. As we have seen, the influx
control laws were perceived as a threat to the maintenance of an
abundant labour supply. Aimed at the eradication of a labour surplus
in the urban areas, these laws were also seen as the potenial
instruments of an artifical labour shortage in the metropolitan areas,
created to induce decentralisation. ASSOCOM and FCI were therefore
anxious to assert their interests in the administration of the policy.
In 1958, at a private meeting of ASSOCOM, FCI, government and municipal
representatives, the government agreed to "set up an experimental
advisory committee on influx control, to meet in regular consultation
with government and municipal officials and to review the supply and
availability of labour." However the scheme was contingent upon its
remaining secret. Once leaked to the press, Verwoerd withdrw his
consent. Organised commerce and industry then remained barred from the
administration of influx control, and any institutionalised consulta-
tion with influx control officers, until 1973 when, after much lobby-
ing, they were granted representatives on Administration Boards.
All in all, during the 1950s, the political interventions by organ-
ised commerce and industry were mostly ineffectual in modifying the
declared intentions of state policy regarding the curbs on the
expansion of urban industry, its workforce and the black urban popula-
tion generally. But then this lobby was mild, since the action taken
in the name of these goals posed no major threats.
The more important and effective intervention in the struggle over
intervention in the struggle over the size of the urban workforce and
its conditions of employment, was made indirectly, by way of the em-
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ployment practices followed routinely by secondary industry and
commerce. It was here that pressure applied deflected the actual
outcomes of state policy away from its original intentions.
This pressure must be understood in relation to the structural eco-
nomic conditions under which commerce and industry operated during the
1950s.
Even during the 1950s, the vast majority of industrial
establishments in South Africa were very small concerns,
employing only a few workers: in 1953-4, for instance, 65%
of all industrial establishments employed fewer than nine
workers, while 92% employed fewer than forty nine.
Their priority was thus the cheapest possible labour, so as to enable
them to enlarge the size of their workforce.
Moreover, most industries remained highly labour-intensive, contrary
to the goal of Apartheid ideologues, the 1950s saw little acceleration
in industrial mechanisation.
During the early 1950s, it was industries like food, bev-
erages, papers and textiles which expanded (together with
the more labour-intensive mineral processing group of in-
dustries), which in the late 1950s, when there was little
growth, -,ihe trend to labour-intensity became even more
marked.
In commerce too, the large majority of blacks employed occupied un-
skilled positions which, according to ASSOCOM, "did not lend themselves
to mechanisation at all", such as packing, unpacking and delivering
goods. In fact, packing for example, does lend itself to mechanisa-
tion. The more pertinent reason for the preponderance of unskilled
black workers in commerce is that labour was sufficiently cheap and
plentiful for there to have been little or no incentive to mechanise.
Under such economic conditions, many branches of secondary industry
and commerce had few, if any, good reasons to prefer employing a
"stabilised" urbanized worker over a migrant. It was often alleged
(although not difinitively proven) that "Africans from other territor-
ies , from homelands and rural areas, were prepared to work for much
lower wages and under more excacting conditions than local Africans".
Furthermore, migrant workers were less "choosy" when it came to accept-
ing employment than Section 10(1)(a) and (b) qualifiers, especially
heavy manual jobs. In 1954, the Manager of the Johannesburg munici-
pality's Non-European Affairs Department complained that "the position
has been reached where local Natives who comply with the (Urban Areas)
Act will not accept unemployment unless it is to their liking". His
counterpart in Benoni noted, moreover, that "the industrialist ... has
been inclined to draw his labour £rom the reserves because he has found
it more amenable to discipline", a trend which was reported to have
continued throughout the decade. Such employers clearly saw in
migrant labour a more docile and abundant (less choosy) workforce, the
advantages of which outstripped any of those attaching to "stabilised"
urban workers.
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Thus, local authorities, government leaders and Chamber of Commerce
reported the widespread preference amongst many employers for migrant,
as opposed to settled urbanized workers.
The effect of such industrial and commercial practise was to subvert
the strict urban labour peference policy on which so much of the
original Apartheid programme depended. Contrary to the calls by organ-
ised commerce and industry for a slow end to the migrant labour system,
many sectors of commerce and industry acted in a way which enhanced
their dependence on migrant labour. This is reflected statistically in
the increasing rate of migrancy during the decade. For example,
according to official statistics, the number of migrants absent from
rural areas on census day increased from 537 000 in 1946 to 887 000 in
1960, an increase, of 65,2% {77,1% in the case of women, and 61,2% in
the case of men).
Why did the AHI, ASSOCOM and FCI, as representatives of the in-
terests of commerce and industry in the country, continue throughout
the decade to take a strong stand against the migrant labour system, at
the same time as many sectors of commerce and industry acted routinely
to perpetrate their dependence on migrant labour?
When organised commerce and industry spoke of the desirability of
ending the migrant labour system and promoting a permanent urban
workforce, they had in mind the lifting of legal restrictions on black
influx to the towns, enabling the increasing rate of black migration
and subsequent urbanisation. In other words, blacks migrating to the
towns in search of employment were not treated as "temporary sojourn-
ers" there, whose periods of urban residence were legally restricted to
their terms of employment. For organised commerce and industry
therefore, the phasing out of migrant labour was part of a very diff-
erent scenario from that envisaged by the state. The state's plan to
reduce urban dependency on migrant labour aimed at sealing off the
urban areas to further black migration.
Organised commerce and industry's stand against migrant labour was
therefore part of a broader political campaign to lift all forms of
"direct and drastic interventions" by the state in controlling the
movements of blacks. As we have seen, this struggle was unsuccessful,
and the apparatuses of influx control remained in tact. It was within
this context, of the failure of organised commerce and industry to
modify the declared goals and methods of state policy, that the optimal
course of action for many sectors of commerce and industry was to
intensify, rather than reduce, their dependence on migrant labour.
This then proved the more effective counter to state policies affecting
the supply of black labour in urban areas.
Apart from the widespread preference for migrant labour, another
noticeable feature of industrial and commercial employment practice was
the high proportion of employment contracts illegally entered and
concluded - that is, without recourse to a labour bureau for the supply
of workers or approval of the contract. Hindson notes that "the in-
ability of the labour bureaux to provide employment services stemmed
from the fact that they were generally avoided by both employers and
workers as a means of obtaining labour and jobs .. . From the evidence
of industrial employers it appears that the majority of contracts of
employment were sealed before the worker had approached the authorities
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and not vice versa, as laid down in the law."
Thus in 1961, a conference of Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioners and
other state officials declared "the present labour bureau system ... a
complete failure, though the principle is sound".
Die buro' s net nie die samewerking van die nywerhede nie.
Sonder die samewerking van die werkgewer kan geen buro reg
funksioneer nie. Daar word gevind dat die werkneraers van
'n werkgewer horn help om ander werknemers te vind.
The labour bureaux therefore failed to gain control of the supply of
labour to industry and commerce. They thus lacked the power to impose
an urban labour preference policy against the preferences of many
industrial and commercial employers.
All in all, therefore, the state failed "to encourage industry in
the European cities to make use of available reservoirs of labour"
before resorting to migrant labour. Influx control policies also
failed to contain, let alone eliminate, unemployment; "the aggregate
level as, well as the overall rate of unemployment rose during the
1950s." The size of the black urban population also swelled, in-
creasing from 2,391 million in 1951 to 3,471 milllion in 1960, a growth
of 45,2%.
The failure of urban labour preference, exposed the contradictions
within Apartheid policy, of which the growth of the black urban popula-
tion and unemployment were symptoms. Theoretically, as long as urban
labour needs were satisfied by urbanized workers first, and as long
these needs equalled or exceeded the number of urbanized workseekers,
unemployment would not arise within this urbanized workforce. The
anomalous affect of Section 10(1) - of allowing the legal urban
residence of unemployed blacks - would thus be suppressed. However,
once the urban labour preference policy failed and the rate of migrancy
and extent of urban unemployment grew, so the gap between the right to
legal urban residence (in terms of Section 10(1)(a)(b)(c) and employ-
ment widened. Also, as the urban population expanded, swelled by
migrants, so the number of prospective candidates for Section 10(l)(b)
rights increased (i.e. ten or fifteen years after equally entering the
prescribed area, as a Section 10(1)(d) qualifier).
At the end of the decade, the state therefore confronted the fact of
an increasing rather than a dimishing rate of black migration to the
towns, and an increasing rather than a decreasing black urban popula-
tion, of which an increasing number would in future be entitled to
settled, "urbanized" status.
Added to this, during the 1950s, black opposition to Apartheid con-
tinued to mount. The ANC called a number of local and national boy-
cotts, rallies and civil disobedience campaigns. By the end of the
decade, state actors saw in the ANC the agent of a "reign of terror ...
to bring to its knees any white government in South Africa". The
late 1950s also saw the resurgence of black trade unionism.
The Sharpeville killings brought this sense of siege to a head.
Witnessing also the rapid and damaging exodus of foreign capital from
the country, the state reacted by clamping down on all radical black
opposition, banning the ANC and PAC and imprisoning their leaders-
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Since black militancy was perceived to be concentrated in the urban
areas, the imposition of strict and uniform controls over all black
urban dwellers took priority over giving "certain definite classes,
guarantees and stability".
The Sharpeville crisis accelerated the abandonment of some of the
original goals of Apartheid policy and the more strenuous commitment to
others, a process which had begun by the beginning of the decade with
the plan to transform the Reserves into self-governing entities in
which all South African blacks would exercise their political rights.
II
The last part of the paper describes briefly the changes and contin-
uities in goals of Apartheid policy during the '60s, and then examines
its methods and outcomes, with reference to the role played by second-
ary industry and commerce-
During the '60s, the commitment to the goals of industrial
decentralisation.and mechanisation within urban industries, was renewed
and intensified. Threats of curbs on industrial expansion in metro-
politan areas and on the Size of the black urban workforce were more
widespread and aggressive. From 1961, the ideas of labour quotas for
prescribed areas, ^ nd labour zoning, featured on the agenda of National
Party congresses, at meetings of state officials and in public
speeches by government leaders. Employers were urged and threatened to
"get by with as little African labour as possible."
Following the perceived failure of the labour bureaux during the
150s, government leaders announced that the commitment to influx and
efflux control was to be stepped up. An article in 1963 by the Depart-
ment of Bantu Administration and Development, for example, reiterated
the fundamental goal of expelling all "unproductive" blacks from
"white" South Africa, and acknowledged the need for more determined
action in this regard.
Dit is staatsbeleid dat die enigste Bantoes wat in
blanke gebiede behoort te wees, slegs die is wat hul
arbeid daar kan verkoop. Sodra hulle nie meer in staat is
nie, of sodra daar geen aanvraag vir hul arbeid is nie,
moet hulle na die Bantoegebiede teruggaan.
Tot dusver kon die Departement wat belas is met die
implementering van hierdie beleid om verskeie redes nie
daadwerklike aandag aan die afdeling gee nie . . . Daar is
vandag letterlik honderde duisende Bantoes in en om ons
stede en op ons platteland wat in die Bantoegebiede geves-
tig behoort te word.
The initiation of homeland "self-government" early in the decade
launched an ideological and political drive to strengthen blacks' ties
with their ethnic "homeland". Ideologically, the emphasis of state
discourse fell upon the uniformity of all blacks, urbanized or not, in
having their true political and cultural "home" in the ethnically
appropriate homeland. The ideology dismissed the notion of a South
African black:
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The most important factor in determining nationality was
not the place whiere they (blacks) were born, but their
place of origin.
Ideologically therefore, the state set out to deny the very distinc-
tion on which the rationale and appartuses of influx control during the
previous decade, had been based - namely, the distinction between two
groups of blacks: one "urbanized" and disconnected from the Reserves,
and the other migrant and therefore bonded to the Reserves. State
actors declared that they "could not accept that any Bantu in South
Africa had completely divorced his association with the homelands."
Tribal distinctions were therefore to be stressed by local authorities
in their dealings ytfith urbanized blacks, on instruction from the
central government- From now on (until the late '70s),
the homeland attachment of Bantu working in white areas is
one of the principle aspects of the policy and is an im-
portant factor in urban black administration.
These ideological shifts accompanied and legitimated the intention
to eradicate the differential status of Section 10(1)(a), (b) and (c)
qualifiers. Du Randt, Director of Bantu Labour, told a FCI meeting
that his "Department looked upon the whole Bantu labour force as
migrant labour" and proposed to amend the legal status of "so-called
urbanised labour so that they also could be put on a migratory basis".
Section 10(1) itself was now declared an ideological and political
anomaly. The Van Rensburg Committee report (1967) for example, con-
cluded that
artikel 10 van Wet No. 25 van 1945 verydelend inwerk op
die hele beleid van afsonderlike ontidkkeling en tot tn
hele reeks wanpraktyke aanleiding gee.
The principle underlying Section 10(1)(c) was attached on the
grounds that "black children who are born in .cities (should) no longer
have an automatic right of residence there." Furthermore, no black
person should be exempt from the prospect of removal, if deemed "super-
fluous" to the labour requirements of the area.
In short, all the "guarantees, security and stability" which Apart-
heid policy had previously set out to confer upon "urbanized Natives",
were now targetted for attack. Apartheid policy was now aimed at
levelling the status and entitlement of all blacks, reducing all to
"temporary sojourners" in "white" South Africa.
To what extent were these revised intentions realised in practice?
The question takes us into a discussion of the role played by secondary
industry and commerce in determining the direction and outcome of state
policy.
While the '60s saw a marked drop in the level of militant black
opposition, struggles between secondary industry, commerce and the
state intensified, as state-imposed restrictions on the labour market
multiplied in the face of an industrial boom. Our discussion of the
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powers exerted by secondary industry and commerce is again confined to
policies affecting the size of the black urban workforce and black
urban population as a whole. Also, again the effects of both the
direct political interventions by organised commerce and industry, and
the indirect pressures exerted by entrepreneurial practice, will be
assessed.
Bjf the early 1960s, many government Ministers and state administra-
tors were convinced of the necessity to limit the labour made avail-
able to urban employers according to labour quotas and to within labour
zones determined by the state. This would force employers to draw
their labour from local supplies first, and within Jftie limits calcula-
ted by state officials to be politically expedient.
The first attempt at implementing these proposals was made in the
1961 Bantu in European Areas Bill, which was dropped completely before
being published. But the 1963 Bantu Laws Amendment Bill repeated the
provision devising draconian Ministerial powers over the allocation of
labour to industry and commerce. The aim of the Bill was to
empower the Minister to make determinations stipulating
the maximum number of Africans who may be employed in any
area, township or class of employment, the proportion
which African labour must have to any other form of
labour, and determinations prohibiting employment of
Africans, or further Africans, in any area, township or
class of employment.
At a meeting of ASSOCOM, FCI, SEIFSA, and other employer organisa-
tions, convened in March 1963 to discuss the Bill, strong objection was
taken to the principle that the "authorities (can) determine what the
labour requirements of a regionftare, and remove the Bantu who are sur-
plus to those requirements." But, having already encountered
Verwoerd's wrath in 1960s when opposing government policy on grounds of
principle, the memorandum submitted to government attacked the Bill
on the grounds of its impracticality rather than its principle. It
noted that "the Bill is silent as to the procedural methods which will
be adopted," and that no provision was made for consultation with em-
ployers, which should be "an essential prerequisite before such a limi-
tation is prescribed." In addition, these prescriptions presupposed
"accurate statistical information", which was lacking, and the "fuller
co-operation of organised industry and commerce", which the memorandum
threatened to withold. The 1964 version of the Bill then dropped all
mention of labour quotas.
The ASSOCOM/FCI/SEIFSA memorandum was correct in arguing that the
procedure and standards whereby the Minister's sweeping powers were to
be applied, had not been thought out. The absence of any practical
programme on this score perhaps contributed to the state•s failure
during the first part of the decade to give effect to its newly
strengthened commitment to curtailing industry's labour supply.
In the latter half of the decade, economic conditions primarily
prompted state officials to raise the issue again, this time success-
fully. Between 1963 and 1968, the physical volume of manufacturing
rose by 8,4% per annum (compared to 5,4% per annum between 1958 and
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1963). The number of workers employed, in the manufacturing sector
increased by 63% between 1960 and 1970. It was against the backdrop
of this escalating demand for industrial and commercial labour,
produced by the soaring growth of these sectors, that the state
introduced the 1967 Physical Planning and Utilisation of Resources
Bill. The bill stipulated that Ministerial approval was required for
the enlargement of any factory or extension of its workforce.
ASSOCOM and FCI's lobby to get the bill withdrawn was ineffectual.
Ironically, the political powers of organised commerce and industry in
deterring state action to curb industrial development, diminished as
the economic strength of commerce and industry increased, during the
boom. By now, according to the Minister of Planning, "the Cabinet had
decided that the principle of this Bill would be enacted. Likewise,
attempts to gain representation for commerce and industry on the
authority implementing the Bill, failed. Instead, the Minister of
Planning retained "absolute discretion to grant or withold approval ...
if he grants his approval he may impose such conditions as he may deem
fit." The only concession wrung from the state was its agreement to
limit the scope of the Bill to extensions to the black workforce.
This time, the Ministerial powers conferred were not in excess of
those intended to be used.
Between January 1968 and January 1972 the government
refused permission to employers to hire another 52 218
African workers in the industrial conurbations; and ...
the Minsiter of Labour proudly told white voters that by
1969 the Government had used other powers to reject
applications to have new industrial zones proclaimed, and
imposed restrictions upon the use of existing industrial
sites which resulted in greventing another 220 000 African
workers being employed.
The clothing industry on the Rand, being labour-intensive, was
particularly badly hit.
In the Transvaal the industry only grew 2%, compared to
the growth of 98,4% ^ Ln the Western Cape and 112,5% in
Durban, from 1968-72.
Most clothing firms in the Transvaal were caught in a catch-22
situation. They were too small to afford to decentralise, but were
simultaneously denied the labour necessary to expand to the point of
being able to bear the costs of decentralisation. Ironically, in
these cases, the application of the Physical Planning Act in fact
contradicted the state's decentralisation policy aimed at encouraging
labour-intensive industries in particular to decentralise.
Persistent lobbying from ASSOCOM and FCI (supported by the Prime
Minister's Economic Advisory Council) failed either to dislodge the law
or ease its application. The rate of refusals to applications for an
extended workforce, rose from 8,6$ to between 19/1/68 and 31/3/73, to
9,7% between 19/1/68 and 31/1/76.
During the 1960s, the state's influx and efflux control policies
were also tightened and extended. By 1958, some Chambers of Industry
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were complaining that "the Native labour bureau system has become un-
wieldly and cumbersome". But the powers of labour bureau officials
were extended and the system of labour bureaux expanded, employers'
opposition notwithstanding. In particular, the Regulations for Labour
Bureaux at Bantu Authorities, 1968, established a hierarchical struc-
ture of regional, territorial, district and tribal labour bureaux so
as to control the allocation of black migrant labour before these
workers left the rural area.
Organised commerce and industry were far more successful in con-
straining many of the state's efforts to undermine the differential
status and entitlements associated with Section 10(l)(a), (b) and (c)
of the urban Areas Act.
In October 1960, the Department of Bantu Affairs and Development
attacked head-on the right to urban residence afforded to Section 10(a)
(b) and (c) qualifiers irrespective of whether or not they remain in
employment. The Bantu in European Areas Bill prescribed, inter alia,
that the removal of "redundant" black persons from a prescribed area be
governed by Ministerial decree alone. Section 10(a9(a)(b)(c) could
thus not confer any immunity against removal. (Recall that eight years
earlier, Verwoerd had described the protection against removal as one
of the motivations of Section 10(1)).
The Bill was never published. But its recommendations resurfaced in
the 1963 Bantu Laws Amendment Bill. Organised commerce and industry
opposed the measure as a threat to the existence of a labour surplus
(even if on a cyclical basis):
The proposals would permit the removal from urban area of
a Bantu worker falling under Section 10(1) in circumstan-
ces where he became unemployed perhaps through cyclical
business fluctuations. Such removals would be an economic
loss to industry and commerce.
The clause was then dropped from the 1964 version of the Bill.
Following the recommendations of the Interdepartmental Committee on
Control Measures (Van Rensburg Committee) in 1967, to abolish Section
10(1) and its associated securities, the matter was again the subject
of draft legislation in 1968. The unpublished draft of the Bantu Laws
Amendment Bill (1968), which was circulated to organised commerce and
industry for comment, was intended to "remove the remaining residential
rights of Bantu in White areas under Section 10(1) of the Urban Areas
Act, and to make residential rights of Bantu in White areas dependent
on whether the authorities consider that their labour is necessary in
such an area or not."
The support of organised commerce and industry was clearly consider-
ed crucial to the fate of the Bill.
The Transvaal Chamber of Industries has, confidentially,
been advised that it would probably secure the integration
of the Witwatersrand or at least portions of the
witwatersrand as a (single) Bantu Labour area if it would
support the removal of the so-called Section 10(1) resi-
dential rights of Bantu.
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The integration of the Witwatersrand as a single labour area had
long been a preference of commerce and industry, and a regular request
by its representative organisations. Yet even the hint of success on
this score did not override opposition to the removal of Section 10(1),
a stand reiterated again when the 1968 unpublished draft of the Bantu
Administration Boards Bill proposed a freeze on the acquisition of
Section 10(1)(a), (b) and (c) rights.
There were at least three reasons for this vigorous defence of
Section 10(1). Firstly, employers feared that
it was a very contentious topic . . . which could be
inflammable from an industrial point of view .., employers
and others had been very successful in dampening down
upsets in the Bantu labour force ... and on these grounds
... (FCI) wished to make an anneal (to the State) not to
introduce topics such as this.
Secondly, Section 10(1)(a)(b) qualifiers were seen as the core of a
"stable" workforce. Continuous and settled urban residence reduced
labour turnover and boosted labour productivity. It offered the better
prospect of a longer term of employment, which was particularly
desirable in the case of semi-skilled workers whose labour was more
valuable for having already absorbed the costs of industrial training,
and for being in short supply.
Thirdly, the residential security which Section 10(1)(a) and (b)
conferred on blacks in urban areas was tantamount to a guarantee for
commerce and industry of labour available in urban areas without
interference from the state. The natural increase of this settled
population, in turn eligible for 10(1)(c) rights, therefore also
guaranteed a growing urban labour supply - protection in itself against
renewed threats from government leaders to curtail this supply.
Organised commerce and industry were not solely responsible for
subverting the attempts to eradicate Section 10(1)(a)(b) and (c)
rights. The threat of black resistance to such moves is likely to have
been an important deterrent. But ASSOCOM, FCI and other Chambers were
clearly persistent and vigorous opponents of such moves. Moreover,
records of meetings betwen representatives of FCI, ASSOCOM and the
Department of Bantu Adminstration and Development suggest that the
views of commerce and industry were considered crucial to the fate of
any draft Bills on the matter. Also, these draft Bills were not
published. Outside of nationalist circles they were circulated only to
organised commerce and industry and municipalities for comment- The
fact that the final versions of the Bills gazetted took heed of many of
the objections raised by the employer organisations therefore suggests
that they exercised an important power in determining the manner of
legislation enacted by the State in respect of the status of Section
10(1).
Successful in their efforts to protect Section 10(1) itself, organ-
ised commerce and industry were nevertheless either ineffectual or un-
involved in opposing other measures which eroded some of the "guaran-
tees, security and stability" originally associated with Section 10(1)
(a), (b) and (c). Each of these measures was designed to help close
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the loopholes which these qualifications represented in the overall
design of Apartheid policy - namely, the possibility of black urban
residence independent of ongoing employment on the one hand and the
prospect of growing rather than a falling population of permanent urban
dwellers, on the other. Thus, each of the guarantees which "unproduc-
tive" Section 10(1)(a), (b) and (c) qualifiers had had against removal
were systematically undermined. For example, the 1964 Bantu Laws
Amendment Act extended the scope of Section 19 of the Urban Areas Act
(in terms of which "idle and undesirable" persons could be "endorsed
out" of the prescribed area) to include Section 10(1), (b) and (c)
qualifiers. Also, the rights of wives and dependent children to join a
man with 10(1)(a) or (b) qualifications were severely restricted, being
made conditional on the woman having gained legal entry to the pre-
scribed area in her own right. The 1968 Bantu Labour Regulations
(Bantu Areas) limited the length of any employment contract involving a
migrant worker (Section 10(1)(d) qualifier) to one year, after which
the worker had to return to the homeland. This enforced break in
employment was thus designed to prevent further acquisition of Section
10(1)(b) qualifications (allotted on the basis of continuous employment
in the prescribed area). In 1970, the Black Homeland Citizenship Act
denied Section 10(1)(a), (b) or (c) qualifications to the children born
of homeland citizens (whose citizenship of their ethnic homeland later
became automatic once the homeland gained "independence"). On the
administrative front, professionals, businessmen, the aged, infirm -
that is, all those who did not satisfy the labour requirements of white
employers - were targetted for removal. The 1968 Township Regula-
tions empowered township superintendents to revoke the residence
permits of any permit holder who, for example, remained unemployed for
more than 30 days, or was deemed unfit for residence - the area by the
superintendent. The minutes of Advisory Board meetings in Johannesburg
record the widespread practice of witholding Section 10(1)(c) rights
from schoolchildren once they left the prescribed area to attend
schools. (No secondary schools were permitted within the area).
Nevertheless, the fact that Section 10(1) remained on the statute
book introduced a new contraction into state policy. We have now seen
that throughout the '60s, the state introduced measures to overturn the
original intention of Section 10(1), of differentiating blacks in
prescribed areas into two categories and providing "certain guarantees,
security and stability" for those classified as "urbanized". The in-
tention of Apartheid policy was now the administrative and legislative
levelling of the black urban population, treating it as "temporary" and
"migrant" in its entirety. At the same time, the state also took ac-
tion to intensify the administration of influx control. The scope and
powers of the labour bureaux were extended so as to add administrative
muscle to the practice of urban labour preference. As long as the
moves to eradicate Section 10(1) were unsuccessful, Section 10(1) re-
mained the instrument of urban labour preference - that is, workseekers
qualifying under Section 10(1)(a)(b) or (c) would have preferential
access to jobs available in the prescribed area. Thus, as Doug Hindson
points out,
ironically, labour bureau controls helped entrench the
permanent African population by discriminating in favour
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of local workers and against outside workers in the
allocation of employment. This helped ensure that local
workers obtained employment with relatively better working
conditions and higher wages.
In this sense, the persistence of Section 10 became self-perpetuat-
ing. It was the instrument of the preferential treatment towards those
whose permanent urban residence was thereby entrenched. While trying
to eradicate this administrative differentiation in the black
population, state policy was in fact reinforcing it.
The intention to obliterate the administrative-legal differentiation
between urbanized and migrant blacks was coupled with moves to inhibit
socio-economic differentials between the two. For example, in 1963,
Black traders in prescribed areas were denied the right to more than
one trading licence. Government leaders argued that if opportunities
for acquiring wealth in prescribed areas (over and above by meeting
white employers' labour requirements) were limited, then the economic
incentive to migrate to prescribed areas would lessen and the incentive
to leave prescribed areas for the homelands would increase. Also, in
1967, the thirty-year leasehold (which, up until then, had defined the
terms of black home "ownership") was revoked. Whereas in the previous
decade home ownership was encouraged, as a symbol of stabilisation and
security, it was now attacked on exactly these grounds, as a vehicle of
unwanted black urban permanence. Letters of exemption (exempting the
holder from the pass laws and liquor laws applicable to blacks) were
attacked for the same sort of reasons. During previous decades, these
exemptions had been conferred on educated and otherwise "stable" black
residents of prescribed areas, according to Ministerial discretion. By
the late 1960s however, no more exemptions were issued. Also, influx
control officers ignored existing letters of exemption, despite pleas
from their black beneficiaries on Advisory Boards that the state could
"win the respect of the educated class" if only "educated bantus (were)
... considered in the rank of their station in life (sic)".
The retention of Section 10(1) had important implications for the
power exerted indirectly by industrial and commercial employers. As in
the ealier decade the impact of industrial and commercial practice was
largely a function of the structural economic environment.
The smashing of the black working class in the early '60s
paved the way politically for the most spectacular econom-
ic boom in South Africa's post-war history. ... Between
1963 and 1968 the GDP at current prices increased by an
annual average rate of 9,3% (compared with 5,2% over the
preceding years).
In the manufacturing sector, the workforce grew by 63% between 1960
and 1970. An increase in labour productivity is reflected in the fact
that between 1958 and 1968 the physical volume of output rose by 6.9%
per annum, compared with a 4,7% per annum growth in employment.
Moreover, the rate of increase in labour productivity itself rose, from
the period 1958-63 to 1963-8, which indicates the growing degree of
capital intensity during the latter period.
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The tendency towards capital-intensity did not develop evenly across
the board. Some industries, such as clothing, remained labour-intens-
ive. Nevertheless, the overall effect of the boom was to heighten the
demand for black skilled and semi-skilled labour within secondary in-
dustry. The growing pace of mechanisation increased the numerical
demand for semi-skilled labour, while the expansion of industry as a
whole opened up many more skilled jobs, to the point where the annual
demand for white labour in industry outstripped the annual rate of in-
crease in the white labour force. Secondary industry thus turned
increasingly to the black population as a source of both semi-skilled
and skilled labour.
From the early 1950s, the state had indicated the elasticity of its
policy in respect of Job Reservations. Given the ideological mileage
made by maintaining the public appearance of rigidity and consistency
on the matter, government leaders never agreed to revoke the policy in
its entirety. In practice however, they accepted and encouraged the
growing utilisation of blacks in semi-skilled positions (provided white
workers' interests were not thereby undercut). (See page 7).
It was during the ' 60s in particular that these openings were ex-
ploited by industry and commerce. The reclassification of skilled jobs
as semi-skilled, and induction of blacks into the latter category, grew
increasingly commonplace. Also, proportion of blacks in unskilled
positions declined.
The increasing reliance on black semi-skilled and skilled labour
should not be over-emphasised, however. The demand for unskilled
labour, while on a sharp decline, was nevertheless significant. In the
Johannesburg prescirbed area, for example, during 1966-7, municipal
figures show the following breakdown of the black male workforce: 8,23%
were employe^ in skilled positions, 24,93% semi-skilled and 66,84%
unskilled.
Thus, the point is not that the need for black unskilled labour
ceased to be important. It is rather that a proportionately greater
number of semi-skilled jobs became available. For this in turn boosted
the proportion of jobs for which employers would have had to prefer em-
ploying Section 10(1)(a) and (b) qualifiers over migrants. The reduced
labour turnover and higher labour productivity associated with
"stabilised" black workers offered employers a better return on their
investment in training blacks in semi-skilled or skilled positions.
Presumably therefore, a higher proportion of Section 10(l)(a) and (b)
qualifiers would have been employed in such positions, and in prefer-
ence to migrant workseekers. This entailed, in turn, that a greater
proportion of the settled urban population would have had access to
better working conditions and higher wages, while correlatively, most
of the new migrants to the towns would have filled unskilled positions,
affording poorer working conditions and lower wages. The result of
such employment practices was therefore the growing socio-economic
differentiation of the industrial and commercial workforce. And this
in turn fitted in with and reinforced the deepening differentiation in
respect of residential security and permanence which was produced
contradictorily by the continued application of Section 10(1) as the
vehicle of an urban labour preference policy. Moreover, these socio-
economic and administrative differentials were widening at exactly the
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time that the state's policy of levelling the socio-economic and admin-
istrative/legal status of all black urban residents, was intensifying.
During the 1960s therefore, secondary industry and commerce
undermined state policies geared towards levelling the black
population, in two ways. Firstly, organised commerce and industry
played an important role in defeating moves to eradicate Section 10(1)
(a), (b) and (c) qualifications. Secondly, industrial and commercial
employment practices (combined with the involuntary effects of the
labour bureaux•s urban labour preference policy) helped to entrench the
security stability, and prospects of improved socio-economic status, of
those urbanized blacks who retained their Section lO(l)(a), (b) and (c)
qualifications through the decade. For by now, the industrial boom had
heightened the economic advantages associated with the permanence and
stability of this settled population.
This discussion of the making and implementation of state policy
during the 1950s and 1960s thus leads to the following conclusions:
1.) Contrary to the picture which emerges in much of the literature,
Apartheid policy during the 1950s and 1960s moved through two distinct
phases. The state's "expressed policy of building (the) economy on
contract labour", which Frederick Johnstone attributes to the state
from the early 1950s onwards, was in fact the mark of the second phase
only. During the first phase, the "expressed policy" of the state (as
distinct from its unintended outcomes) was to initiate ways of reducing
the economic dependence on contract labour. Contrary to the "cheap
labour power thesis" (as Hindson has argued), this in turn led to the
instruction of influx control policies and legislation expressly
designed to differentiate the black workforce and population into two
distinct groupings: one "urbanized" and afforded greater "guarantees,
security and stability" to protect that status; and the other, "tem-
porary vistors" to the prescribed areas whose residence there remained
contingent upon employment. It was only in the 1960s that the state's
expressed policy was promised upon the levelling of the black popula-
tion.
2. ) In each of these phases, moreover, many of the outcomes of
Apartheid policy did not coincide with its expressed intentions.
During the 1950s, the urban labour preference policy failed and the
economic dependence on migrant labour increased, rather than decreased.
Then, during the 1960s, strategies to eradicate altogether the
differential political and administrative status of Section 10(1)(a),
(b) and (c) qualifiers also failed (although state practice succeeded
in diminishing the "guarantees, security and stability" associated with
these qualifications during the 1960s).
3. ) Each of these phases of Apartheid policy was internally
contradictory, in the following ways at least. During the 1950s, the
short term goal of this policy was the reduction of rate of black
migration to the cities and stabilisation of the existing black urban
population. Its long-term intention was progressively to reduce its
size as much as possible and dismantle its permanence. However, the
policies introduced to give effect to the short-term intention negated
the long-term prospect. The legislation promulgated to stabilise the
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urban population implied that the size of this settled black population
would grow, rather than diminish, as each successive generation became
entitled to the same status and rights. Furthermore, the stability of
this population was defined in a way which contradicted the fundamental
Nationalist conviction that the presence of blacks in so-called "white"
areas was justified by their employment alone. The failure of the
drive to eradicate Section 10(1) during the second phase of Apartheid
carried these contradictions over into this second phase. Moreover,
the drive to undermine the stability of the urbanized black population,
so as to eliminate this barrier to the realisation of the long-term
goal, was itself locked in a contradiction. As long as Section 10(1)
remained on the statute book, the state's urban labour preference
policy (designed to help reduce the rate of migration to the towns)
simply entrenched the differential and permanent status of this urban
population.
4.) The making and application of Apartheid during both these phases,
was the subject of struggle, not simply from black political movements
and trade unions, but also from within the capitalist sector. Second-
ary industry and commerce, for example, were active participants in
determining the nature of state policy, on the one hand, and the extent
to which the complementation of this policy adhered to its original
intentions, on the other. When state policy intended to reduce
economic dependence on migrant labour, secondary industry and commerce
acted in ways which perpetuated it. Then, when state policy intended
to undermine the differential status of Section 10(1)(a), (b) and (c)
qualifiers, secondary industry and commerce acted to protect and
perpetuate these differentials.
Thus employers in industry and commerce were not simply passive
beneficiaries of a system which guaranteed that their "legitimate
labour requirements" were met. The definition of what constituted
"legitimate labour requirements" was itself the focus of conflict be-
tween industry, commerce and the State. Furthermore, the definition
which state policies operationalised did not uniformly or automatically
benefit the interests of industrial and commercial employers. For ex-
ample, the drive to impose quotas on the employment of blacks in indus-
tries in metropolitan areas, which culminated in the Physical Planning
Act, dealt a severe blow to labour-intensive industries, such as the
clothing industry on the Rand.
5.) Finally therefore, while Apartheid did prove overall to be
functional for capitalist development, it is a mistake to conceive of
this partnership in functionalist terms. For, state policies during
this period did not consistently promote capitalist interests. Nor
were political interests always subordinate to economic ones, in the
manner presupposed by a functionalist explanation of the relationship
between Apartheid and capitalism. While it is true that Apartheid
promoted capitalist development, this does not entail that "there is a
marked abs.ence of conflict between capitalist development and
Apartheid".
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